Corporate social responsibility was historically a business-oriented idea that companies should voluntarily improve their social and environmental practices. More recently, CSR has increasingly attracted governments’ attention, and is now promoted in public policy, especially in the European Union. Conflicts can arise, however, when advanced welfare states introduce CSR into public policy. The reason for such conflict is that CSR leaves key public welfare issues to the discretion of private business. This voluntary issue assignment contrasts starkly with advanced welfare states’ traditions (...) favoring negotiated agreements and strong regulation to control corporate conduct. This article analyzes the conflicts and compatibilities arising when advanced welfare states introduce CSR, focusing on how the two traditions diverge and on how conflicts are reconciled. Empirically the study focuses on four Nordic countries—Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden—widely recognized as the most advanced welfare states, and increasingly as leaders in CSR public policy. From interviews of 55 officials of government ministries, nongovernmental organizations, labor unions, and employer associations, the authors conclude that tension indeed exists between CSR public policies and advanced welfare state traditions in all four countries. Whereas CSR’s aims are compatible with Nordic institutional traditions, the means promoted in CSR is in conflict with such Nordic traditions as corporatist agreements and rights-based welfare state regulation of social and environmental issues. There is harmony of goals, but conflict in means between the four Nordic countries studied. (shrink)

While much has been written about the functional profile of intentions, and about their normative or rational status, comparatively little has been said about the subjective authority of intention. What is it about intending that explains the ‘hold’ that an intention has on an agent—a hold that is palpable from her first-person perspective? I argue that several prima facie appealing explanations are not promising. Instead, I maintain that the subjective authority of intention can be explained in terms of the inner (...) structure of intention. In adopting an intention the agent comes to see herself as criticizable depending on whether she executes the intention. This allows us to explain in first-personal terms why the agent becomes disposed to act and deliberate in ways that are characteristic of intention. As intention-formation involves profound changes to reflexive evaluative attitudes, this is the ‘Self-Evaluation’ view of the subjective authority of intention. (shrink)

It has been widely accepted that intentional actions are “the actions to which “a certain sense of the question ‘why?’ is given application” (Anscombe 1957/2000: 9). But there are robust reasons for thinking that this claim is false. First, there are intentional actions for which such questions are unsound. We have good reasons for thinking that the questions are not “given application” in these cases. Second, when these questions are “given application” this is best explained, it is argued, not in (...) terms of a necessary link between intentional action and this type of enquiry, but in terms of the fact that this is an enquiry that we pursue when we take an agent to have exercised certain of their rational capacities. (shrink)

I argue for the distinction between presuming that p and maintaining that presumably p. In order to make sense of this distinction, I defend a non-inferentialist conception of presumptions and offer an account of the correctness conditions for both presumptions and presumptive inferences. I characterize presumptions as a type of constative speech-act having certain semantic correctness conditions. In turn, regarding presumptive inferences, my strategy is to provide the correctness conditions for the use of an epistemic modal such as “presumably.” This (...) epistemic modal is characterized as a force indicator for speech-acts of concluding in complex speech-acts of arguing involving presumptive inferences. (shrink)

The role and influence of workplace spirituality on individual and organisational outcomes continue to draw attention among management scholars. Despite this increased attention, extant literature has yielded limited insights particularly into the impact and influence processes of workplace spirituality on performance outcomes at both the individual and unit levels of analysis. Addressing this gap in research, we proposed and tested a multilevel model, underpinned by social cognitive theory, that examines the processes linking perceptions of workplace spirituality and performance outcomes at (...) the individual and organisational level of analysis. Data were obtained from 51 branches of a retail organisation in the United Kingdom. Results from structural equation modelling analysis revealed three salient findings. First, workplace spirituality was positively related to ethical climate, prosocial motivation, and moral judgment. Second, ethical climate partially mediated the relationship between workplace spirituality and prosocial motivation and moral judgment, respectively. Third, aggregated ethical climate significantly relates to branch-level helping behaviour and service performance. (shrink)

Open Peer Review: Educational Philosophy and Theory (EPAT)Michael A. Peters, Beijing Normal University, PR ChinaIn 2016 EPAT started experimenting with open peer review for articles that were part...

Aim:This study explores experiences of patients suffering from Korsakoff’s syndrome. It contributes to improved reflection on the value of patient knowledge.Background:An ethics of care perspective states the importance of moving to patients in their vulnerable state of being, and to figure out patients’ individual needs necessary to provide good care. The information given by patients suffering from Korsakoff’s syndrome might be mistaken, invented and even not true. The value of these patients’ experiences and knowledge had not been researched to date.Method:Data (...) from six in-depth interviews were analysed concurrently through the constant comparative method.Ethical considerations:The principles of voluntariness, confidentiality and anonymity were respected during the research process.Findings:Four important themes within patients’ knowledge emerged: health condition, involuntary admission into the nursing home, the daily routine and interpretation of the caring abilities of healthcare professionals. The findings show that our respondents were able to provide a window into their inner perspective.Conclusion:This study deepens our understanding of the value of patient knowledge in situations where patients see the world in a different manner as do healthcare professionals. The conversations revealed personal subjective knowledge which our respondents create and live by. Healthcare professionals are encouraged to discover and affirm the understandings of these patients, and not be prepossessed due to the diagnosis or general nursing home rules. Understanding patients’ unique knowledge through appreciation of the complexity and richness of different views on the situation can assist to give a more humane response to individual needs and pain. Health staff in healthcare institutions are encouraged to evaluate the – unintended – effect of rigidly applied nursing home rules, and the government is challenged to rethink its policy about care, and provide more resources permitting relational care that nurtures the dignity of patients suffering from Korsakoff’s syndrome. (shrink)

Following a Toulmian account of argument analysis and evaluation, I offer a general unitary schema for, so called, deductive and inductive types of analogical arguments. This schema is able to explain why certain analogical arguments can be said to be deductive, and yet, also defeasible.

Drawing on the problem of deviance, I present a novel line of argumentation against causal theories of action. The causalist faces a dilemma: either she adopts a simple account of the causal route between intention and outcome, at the cost of failing to rule out deviance cases, or she adopts a more sophisticated account, at the cost of ruling out cases of intentional action in which the causal route is merely unusual. Underlying this dilemma, I argue, is that the agent's (...) perspective plays an ineliminable role in determining which causal pathways are deviant and which are not. (shrink)

Both because of the vagueness of the word ‘give’ when speaking about giving reasons, and because we lack an adequate definition of ‘reasons’, there is a harmful ambiguity in the expression ‘giving reasons’. Particularly, straightforwardly identifying argumentation with reasons giving would make of virtually any interplay a piece of argumentation. Besides, if we adopt the mainstream definition of reasons as “considerations that count in favour of doing or believing something”, then only good argumentation would count as argumentation. In this paper, (...) I defend a qualified characterization of argumentation as reasons giving that is shown to be fruitful for shedding light on the practice of giving reasons, and an inferentialist conception of reasons that makes room for speaking of “bad reasons” and, consequently, makes it possible to talk of argumentation as reasons giving even if we are talking about bad argumentation. (shrink)

Both because of the vagueness of the word ‘give’ when speaking about giving reasons, and because we lack an adequate definition of ‘reasons’, there is a harmful ambiguity in the expression ‘giving reasons’. Particularly, straightforwardly identifying argumentation with reasons giving would make of virtually any interplay a piece of argumentation. Besides, if we adopt the mainstream definition of reasons as “considerations that count in favour of doing or believing something”, then only good argumentation would count as argumentation. In this paper, (...) I defend a qualified characterization of argumentation as reasons giving that is shown to be fruitful for shedding light on the practice of giving reasons, and an inferentialist conception of reasons that makes room for speaking of “bad reasons” and, consequently, makes it possible to talk of argumentation as reasons giving even if we are talking about bad argumentation. (shrink)

Well‐functioning agents ordinarily have an excellent epistemic relationship to their intentional actions. This phenomenon is often characterized as knowledge of what one is doing and labeled “practical knowledge”. But when we examine it carefully, it seems to require a particular kind of understanding ‐ understanding of the normative structure of one's action. Three lines of argument are offered to support this Necessity of Understanding thesis. The first appeals to the nature of intentional action and the second to our everyday reasons (...) explanation of action. The final line of argument draws on a practical amnesia case in which an agent forgets her overall goal while acting. Implications of the Necessity of Understanding thesis for the widely endorsed non‐observational view of practical knowledge are briefly discussed. It is argued that support for the non‐observational view is weaker than has been appreciated. (shrink)

This volume gives an overview on the currently debated ethical issues regarding advance directives from an international perspective. It focuses on a wider understanding of the known and widely accepted concept of patient self-determination for future situations. Although advance directives have been widely discussed since the 1980s, the ethical bases of advance directives still remain a matter of heated debates. The book aims to contribute to these controversial debates by integrating fundamental ethical issues on advance directives with practical matters of (...) their implementation. Cultural, national and professional differences in how advance directives are understood by health care professions and by patients, as well as in laws and regulations, are pinpointed. (shrink)

a recent paper, Fábio Perin Shecaira proposes a defence of Waller’s deductivist schema for moral analogical argumentation. This defence has several flaws, the most important of them being that many good analogical arguments would be deemed bad or deficient. Additionally, Shecaira misrepresents my alternative account as something in between deductivism and non-deductivism. This paper is both an attempt at solving this misunderstanding and an analysis and criticism of Waller and Shecaira’s forms of deductivism.

In debates about rationalizing action explanation causalists assume that the psychological states that explain an intentional action have both causal and rational features. I scrutinize the presuppositions of those who seek and offer rationalizing action explanations. This scrutiny shows, I argue, that where rational features play an explanatory role in these contexts, causal features play only a presuppositional role. But causal features would have to play an explanatory role if rationalizing action explanation were a species of causal explanation. Consequently, we (...) should conclude that action explanation is not a species of causal explanation. (shrink)

Joshua Knobe's work has marshaled considerable support for the hypothesis that everyday judgments of whether an action is intentional are systematically influenced by evaluations of the action or agent. The main source of evidence for this hypothesis is a series of surveys that involve an agent either helping or harming something as a side effect. Respondents are much more likely to judge the side effect intentional if harm is involved. It is a remarkable feature of the discussion so far that (...) it assumes without scrutiny that the substitution of one act-type for another could not, taken alone, explain the difference in responses that the two scenarios yield. This paper presents evidence, both experimental and conceptual, that it is precisely this difference that explains the asymmetry in responses. Briefly, agents who token the act-type help must fulfill certain psychological conditions that they don't have to fulfill if they are to token the act-type harm. Harming, unlike helping, does not require the ful.. (shrink)

Our aim is to defend the Precautionary Principle (PP) against the main theoretical and practical criticisms that it has raised by proposing a novel conception and a specific formulation of the principle. We first address the theoretical concerns against the idea of there being a principle of precaution by arguing for a distinctively political conception of the PP as opposed to a moral one. Our claim is that the rationale of the PP is grounded in the fact that contemporary societies (...) wish to avoid morally unacceptable risks while at the same time pursuing other goals, aspirations and values. Following this political conception of the PP, we propose a specific formulation in terms of an argumentation scheme—the Argumentation Scheme for Appealing to Precaution—which is meant to solve, in turn, the main practical concerns that the PP has raised. We explain the advantages of our proposal by analysing appeals to precaution in the cases of (1) the European restrictions on the free movement of persons during the COVID-19 pandemic and (2) the discharge of nuclear wastes into the Irish Sea. (shrink)

How can we deal with the diversity of theories in mathematics education? This was the main question that led the authors of this book to found the Networking Theories Group. Starting from the shared assumption that the existence of different theories is a resource for mathematics education research, the authors have explored the possibilities of interactions between theories, such as contrasting, coordinating, and locally integrating them. The book explains and illustrates what it means to network theories; it presents networking as (...) a challenging but fruitful research practice and shows how the Group dealt with this challenge considering five theoretical approaches, namely the approach of Action, Production, and Communication (APC), the Theory of Didactical Situations (TDS), the Anthropological Theory of the Didactic (ATD), the approach of Abstraction in Context (AiC), and the Theory of Interest-Dense Situations (IDS). A synthetic presentation of each theory and their connections shows how the activity of networking generates questions at the theoretical, methodological and practical levels and how the work on these questions leads to both theoretical and practical progress. The core of the book consists of four new networking case studies which illustrate what exactly can be gained by this approach and what kind of difficulties might arise. (shrink)

Patient’s decision making competence is a widely discussed subject. Issues of competence, autonomy, well-being and protection of the patient come up every day. In this article we analyse what role PDMC plays in Dutch legislation and what dilemmas healthcare professionals may experience, notably in patients suffering from Korsakoff’s syndrome. Dilemmas emerge if professionals want to meet the requirements mentioned in Dutch law and the desires of their patients. The autonomy of the patient and the healthcare professionals’ duty to take care (...) of their patient’s best interests, create a tension and lead to uncomfortable situations. Healthcare professionals describe difficulty finding a balance between these issues and assessing the degree of mental competence still present. In long term care situations, quality of the relationship between healthcare professionals and their patients seems to be of much more importance in decision making on minor issues of competence than simply relying on legal or house rules. In being committed to their cases, professionals will be more sensitive to individuals habits, abilities, welfare and dignity, which will make it easier to decide on issues of competence, and to find creative solutions to their dilemmas. (shrink)

Induced by intake of the psychedelic substances LSD, psilocybin, DMT and mescaline, psychedelic experiences have been extensively described by subjects as entailing a most unusual increase in the scope and quality of their consciousness. Accordingly, psychedelic experiences have been widely characterised as an “expansion of consciousness.” This article poses the following question, as yet unaddressed in contemporary philosophy and the tradition of phenomenology: to what exactly does “expansion of consciousness” refer as a general characterisation of psychedelic experiences, and what role (...) might attention play therein? On the basis of Aron Gurwitsch’s phenomenology of attention, the following thesis is presented: (a) “expansion of consciousness” refers to a particular restructuration of consciousness in psychedelic experiences. (b) This occurs by means of certain extreme transformations in direction, scope, mode and degree of attention. In order to explicate this thesis, the characteristic features of psychedelic experiences that pertain to expansion of consciousness and attention are first systematically identified from a survey of subject reports. Second, it is demonstrated that the few previous attempts to understand expansion of consciousness in terms of attention as a filter/reducing-valve, spotlight or zoom-lens each fail to explain how consciousness is structured in psychedelic experiences. Third, it is argued that psychedelic expansion of consciousness is a general restructuration of consciousness by means of extreme attentional transformations. In conclusion, brief consideration is given to the question of whether psychedelic expansion of consciousness can have epistemic and ethical value for life. (shrink)

What is special about successful action explanation is that it reveals what the agent saw in her action. Most contemporary philosophers assume that this amounts to explanation in terms of the reason for which the agent acted. They also assume that such explanations conform to a realist picture of explanation. What is disputed is whether the reason is a psychological state or a normative state of affairs . I argue that neither psychological states nor their contents suffice to make actions (...) intelligible in the right way , while Anti-Psychologism can’t explain acting on bad reasons . The alternative that I propose, Proceduralism, has it that explaining an action requires simulating the agent’s practical deliberation. On this view, explanation is not grounded in reasons, and thereby avoids the problems with “bad” reasons that Anti-Psychologism faces. Instead, in simulating to the same conclusion as the agent, the “explainer” comes to see what the agent saw in her action, thereby satisfying the Reasonableness Constraint. Proceduralism requires giving up on the assumption that the reason for which the agent acts explains the action and on the realist picture of action explanation. In addition, it accounts for the incomprehension that explainers experience when they encounter “alien” psychologies – psychologies that are deeply different from their own. (shrink)

Purpose: According to literature, students' attitudes towards peers with disabilities are crucial for the social inclusion of students with disabilities.Therefore, knowledge about students' behavioral intention to interact with peers with intellectual disability can help improve the social inclusion of students with ID. This study aimed to examine the psychometric properties of the Arabic version of the Behavioral Intention to Interact with Peers with Intellectual Disability Scale.Data were collected from 887 elementary school students (591 female and 296 male) from third to (...) sixth grades in Saudi Arabia.Psychometric properties of the BIS were examined with a confirmatory factor analysis, measurement invariance analysis (across gender), and reliability scales (internal consistency).The results supported the two-dimensional structure of the BIS. The internal consistency of the BIS and each of its subscales was good.Furthermore, no measurement variance was found for male and female students.The Arabic version of the scale showed good psychometric properties and therefore can be recommended to measure students' behavioral intention to interact with peers with intellectual disability. (shrink)

Martin Heideggers Denken nach 1938 ist vor allem durch drei grosse Themen gepragt: den Wandel des Menschenbildes, die Einfuhrung eines neuen Begriffes vom Denken und den Nachweis, dass Sein Seyn in Beziehung ist. Dabei stutzt er sich auf das Denken Franz Rosenzweigs, das bereits in der Formulierung von Sein und Zeit erkennbar ist, in den Schriften der 40er und 50er Jahre aber in besonders intensiver Weise nachwirkt. Ausgehend von dieser Zusammenschau von Heideggers und Rosenzweigs Denken zeichnet sich auch eine neue (...) Bewertung des Denkens von Emmanuel Levinas ab. (shrink)

Die interdisziplinär angelegte Untersuchung befaßt sich mit John Barclays (1582-1621) neulateinischem Staatsroman "Argenis" (1621), einem tagespolitischen Schlüsselroman auf dem Hintergrund der französischen Religionskriege. Die "Argenis" ist ein parteipolitisches Pamphlet gegen die Monarchomachen, speziell gegen die militanten Hugenotten; zugleich wird untersucht, inwiefern dieser höchst komplexe Roman aber auch Entwurf und Utopie des idealen Staates, Fürstenspiegel für Ludwig XIII. sowie Manifest und Proklamation der absolutistischen Staatslehre ist. Grundlage der Interpretation, die den Roman im Kontext des politischen Denkens und der 'politischen' Schriften seines (...) Autors untersucht, ist die Beschäftigung mit denjenigen staatstheoretischen Werken aus Mittelalter und Früher Neuzeit, die Barclays Denken prägten (u.a. die Schriften seines Vaters William, Jean Bodins und Jakobs I. von England). Als unabdingbar erwies sich dabei auch eine gründliche Auseinandersetzung mit dem Themenkomplex Staatsrechtfertigung, also der Frage nach dem Grund und der Grenze des dem Staat geschuldeten Gehorsams, vor dem Hintergrund der konfessionellen Bürgerkriege und der Suprematieansprüche des Papsttums über die weltlichen Fürsten. Hier wurden erstmals auch die im vatikanischen Geheimarchiv und in der Vatikanbibliothek aufbewahrten Quellen zu Barclay herangezogen. (shrink)

Wir diskutieren ethische Probleme der medizinischen Behandlung intersexueller Kinder. Gefragt wird nach dem Stellenwert von Elternwünschen nach eindeutiger Geschlechtszuweisung sowie nach den Konfliktfeldern, die zum einen zwischen konkurrierenden Wunschvorstellungen der Eltern und der behandelnden Ärzte, zum andern zwischen Kindeswohl und Kinderrechten entstehen können. Gegenwärtig wird Neugeborenen mit anatomisch uneindeutigem Genital trotz unsicherer Prognose über die Behandlungsergebnisse oft noch ein Geschlecht zugewiesen und operativ erstellt. Dieses Vorgehen ist von verschiedenen Seiten ethisch heftig kritisiert worden. Kipnis u. Diamond forderten 1998 im „Journal (...) of Clinical Ethics“ ein Moratorium für alle nicht vital indizierten geschlechtskorrigierenden Eingriffe. Diese Forderung orientiert sich am Interesse des zukünftigen Erwachsenen, betont dessen prospektive Autonomie und klammert den Elternwunsch aus. Dieses „Modell des antizipierten Konsenses“ kann jedoch mit Bezug auf Neugeborene und Kleinkinder bedeutsame Aspekte des Eltern-Kind-Verhältnisses nicht angemessen erfassen. Im Aufsatz werden Argumente angeführt, die es aus Sicht einer Ethik der Elternschaft rechtfertigen, ethische Entscheidungen auf der Basis eines beziehungsorientierten Modells zu treffen. In unserem Modell fallen Elternwünsche ethisch ins Gewicht. (shrink)

Wir diskutieren ethische Probleme der medizinischen Behandlung intersexueller Kinder. Gefragt wird nach dem Stellenwert von Elternwünschen nach eindeutiger Geschlechtszuweisung sowie nach den Konfliktfeldern, die zum einen zwischen konkurrierenden Wunschvorstellungen der Eltern und der behandelnden Ärzte, zum andern zwischen Kindeswohl und Kinderrechten entstehen können. Gegenwärtig wird Neugeborenen mit anatomisch uneindeutigem Genital trotz unsicherer Prognose über die Behandlungsergebnisse oft noch ein Geschlecht zugewiesen und operativ erstellt. Dieses Vorgehen ist von verschiedenen Seiten ethisch heftig kritisiert worden. Kipnis u. Diamond forderten 1998 im „Journal (...) of Clinical Ethics“ ein Moratorium für alle nicht vital indizierten geschlechtskorrigierenden Eingriffe. Diese Forderung orientiert sich am Interesse des zukünftigen Erwachsenen, betont dessen prospektive Autonomie und klammert den Elternwunsch aus. Dieses „Modell des antizipierten Konsenses“ kann jedoch mit Bezug auf Neugeborene und Kleinkinder bedeutsame Aspekte des Eltern-Kind-Verhältnisses nicht angemessen erfassen. Im Aufsatz werden Argumente angeführt, die es aus Sicht einer Ethik der Elternschaft rechtfertigen, ethische Entscheidungen auf der Basis eines beziehungsorientierten Modells zu treffen. In unserem Modell fallen Elternwünsche ethisch ins Gewicht. (shrink)

In “Deductivism as an Interpretative Strategy: A Reply to Groarke’s Defense of Reconstructive Deductivism,” David Godden distinguished two notions of deductivism. On the one hand, as an interpretative thesis, deductivism is the view that all-natural language argumentation must be interpreted as being deductive. On the other hand, as an evaluative thesis, deductivism is the view that for a conclusion to follow, it has to follow of necessity from the premises—or, in other words, that being a good inference implies being deductive. (...) The main goal of this paper is to show that evaluative deductivism is wrong. (shrink)

I defend a conception of Logic as normative for the sort of activities in which inferences super-vene, namely, reasoning and arguing. Toulmin’s criticism of formal logic will be our framework to shape the idea that in order to make sense of Logic as normative, we should con-ceive it as a discipline devoted to the layout of arguments, understood as the representations of the semantic, truth relevant, properties of the inferences that we make in arguing and reason-ing.

Wir diskutieren ethische Probleme der medizinischen Behandlung intersexueller Kinder. Gefragt wird nach dem Stellenwert von Elternwünschen nach eindeutiger Geschlechtszuweisung sowie nach den Konfliktfeldern, die zum einen zwischen konkurrierenden Wunschvorstellungen der Eltern und der behandelnden Ärzte, zum andern zwischen Kindeswohl und Kinderrechten entstehen können. Gegenwärtig wird Neugeborenen mit anatomisch uneindeutigem Genital trotz unsicherer Prognose über die Behandlungsergebnisse oft noch ein Geschlecht zugewiesen und operativ erstellt. Dieses Vorgehen ist von verschiedenen Seiten ethisch heftig kritisiert worden. Kipnis u. Diamond forderten 1998 im „Journal (...) of Clinical Ethics“ ein Moratorium für alle nicht vital indizierten geschlechtskorrigierenden Eingriffe. Diese Forderung orientiert sich am Interesse des zukünftigen Erwachsenen, betont dessen prospektive Autonomie und klammert den Elternwunsch aus. Dieses „Modell des antizipierten Konsenses“ kann jedoch mit Bezug auf Neugeborene und Kleinkinder bedeutsame Aspekte des Eltern-Kind-Verhältnisses nicht angemessen erfassen. Im Aufsatz werden Argumente angeführt, die es aus Sicht einer Ethik der Elternschaft rechtfertigen, ethische Entscheidungen auf der Basis eines beziehungsorientierten Modells zu treffen. In unserem Modell fallen Elternwünsche ethisch ins Gewicht. (shrink)

Conservation can occur anywhere regardless of scale, political jurisdiction, or landownership. We present a framework to help managers at protected areas practice conservation at the scale of relationships. We focus on relationships between stakeholders and protected areas and between managers and other stakeholders. We provide a synthesis of key natural resources literature and present a case example to support our premise and recommendations. The purpose is 4-fold: 1) discuss challenges and threats to conservation and protected areas; 2) outline a relationship-scale (...) approach to address conservation threats; 3) describe the tools and techniques that can be used to implement this approach; and 4) present a case example from rural Alaska, USA, to illustrate relationship-scale conservation. Our case example illustrates how aspects of this approach to conservation were applied to address a wildlife population decline. Tools needed to implement relationship-scale conservation include 1) collecting and documenting narratives of place; 2) measuring and monitoring trust and commitment; and 3) identifying and mitigating threats. We recommend that planners and managers, working with their research partners, redefine and refocus their goals and objectives to include these practices. Doing so will enable them to gain substantial applied knowledge about their stakeholders and foster and maintain place relationships as desired outcomes of conservation. The ultimate outcome is a better prognosis for long-term global survival of protected areas and biodiversity. Published 2014. This article is a U.S. Government work and is in the public domain in the USA. (shrink)

I propose a characterization of the dialectical dimension of argumentation by considering the activity of arguing as involving a “second order intersubjectivity”. I argue that argumentative communication enables this kind of intersubjectivity as a matter of the recursive nature of acts of arguing—both as justificatory and as persuasive devices. Calling attention to this feature is a way to underline that argumentative discourses represent the explicit part of a dynamic activity, “a mechanism of rational validation”, as Rescher showed, which is a (...) practice that presupposes the possibility of attaining objectivity. (shrink)

I argue that conductions are a special type of inference indeed, but that this does not mean that we need to develop novel standards of inference goodness or specific argument schemes for properly assessing them. Following LNMA’s theoretical framework, I provide a semantic account of conductions and explain the interesting pragmatic properties of a certain type of conductions in terms of the rhetorical dimension of the speech-act of arguing.